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Case Comment
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the
Alien Tort Claims Act
On March 11, 1978, thirteen heavily armed members of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) landed on the north-
ern coast of Israel, commandeered a bus, and began a rampage
of hostage taking and summary executions until the Israeli po-
lice were finally able to stop them. The incident resulted in the
deaths of thirty-four persons and serious injuries to eighty-
seven others.' On March 10, 1981, the Israeli survivors and rep-
resentatives of the deceased brought an action in the United
States against the PLO,2 alleging multiple tortious acts in viola-
tion of international law. The plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction
1. The plaintiffs alleged that 13 PLO terrorists, acting in conspiracy with
the Libyan Arab Republic, landed near the civilian highway between Haifa
and Tel Aviv with the goal of taking and executing civilian hostages in order
to secure the release of certain PLO terrorists held in Israeli jails. Upon land-
ing on a beach, the terrorists shot and killed an American photographer for no
apparent reason. They then stopped a taxi and killed its passengers, after
which they seized an unarmed bus carrying families home from a company
outing and randomly killed some of the passengers. While shooting at passing
automobiles, they killed and wounded many other people. Next, the terrorists
seized another unarmed civilian bus and forced its passengers aboard the first
bus. The bus finally stopped after crashing through a blockade set up by the
Israeli police. In an effort to escape, the terrorists threw grenades at the bus
and fled, using a girl as a shield. The bus ignited in flames, which consumed
those passengers tied to their seats. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726
F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
1354 (1985); 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring); see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,
1978, at A10, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1978, at All, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Mar.
12, 1978, at Al, col. 6.
2. The defendants in the original action included the PLO, the Libyan
Arab Republic, the Palestine Information Office, the National Association of
Arab Americans, and the Palestine Congress of North America. See Hanoch
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 544-45 (D.D.C. 1981),
affd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354
(1985). The district court dismissed the claims against the latter three groups
because of an insufficient nexus to the alleged tort. See 517 F. Supp. at 549.
The court also concluded that the claim against Libya was barred by the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982), which preserves
sovereign immunity for tort claims unless the injury or death occurs in the
United States. See 517 F. Supp. at 549 n.3.
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pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act ("section 1350" or the
"Act"),3 which grants federal district courts original jurisdiction
over aliens' tort actions that allege a violation of international
law. The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia dismissed the lawsuit, finding that section 1350 did not
provide subject matter jurisdiction.4 On appeal, a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed the dismissal. Although agreeing on the result, the
analysis of each judge differed dramatically. The panel could
not reach a consensus on whether the PLO's acts of terrorism,
summary execution, and hostage taking constituted violations
of international law within the meaning of the Alien Tort
Claims Act; whether the statute provides a private cause of ac-
tion; or whether the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question.5
Underlying each judge's analysis seems to be a fear that
prior interpretations of the Alien Tort Claims Act would lead
to an overabundance of alien claims in the federal courts for
torts occurring outside the territory of the United States. This
Comment attempts to allay such fears. It first examines past
applications of the Alien Tort Claims Act and compares Tel-
Oren's reinterpretation of the Act with prior interpretations of
the Act. Then, postjurisdictional limitations not raised in the
earlier cases are explored in light of Tel-Oren. Finally, the
Comment addresses the impact of the Tel-Oren court's misun-
derstanding of precedent on the resolution of future section
1350 cases.
Originally promulgated as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789,6 the Alien Tort Claims Act provides that "[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States."7 The lack of contempo-
raneous legislative discussion 8 has left subsequent judges and
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
4. See Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 549-
50 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985). The court stated that § 1350 "serves merely as an en-
trance into the federal courts and in no way provides a cause of action." See
517 F. Supp. at 549.
5. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
6. Ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982)).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
8. Judge Bork noted in Tel-Oren that the House debates regarding the
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scholarly commentators to speculate about the purpose of the
Act.9 Some judges and scholars, for example, believe that Con-
gress sought only to prevent biased judgments by providing
alien plaintiffs suing in the United States access to the federal
courts. 10 Others believe that the original purpose of section
1350 was to provide a private cause of action for violations of
international law."
The infrequent use of the statute provides courts with little
judicial guidance. Over the past two hundred years, courts
have conferred jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act in
Judiciary Act did not mention the alien tort claims provision; the Senate de-
bates were not recorded. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (citing 1 ANNALs OF CONGRESS 782-833 (J. Gales ed.
1789)).
9. For general discussions of the Alien Tort Claims Act, see, e.g., Blum &
Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims:
The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 53
(1981); Note, The Alien Tort Statute: International Law as the Rule of Deci-
sion, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 874 (1981); Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdic-
tion, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933 (1982); Comment, The Loneliness of the Long
Distance Statute, The Alien Tort Claims Ac 28 U.S.C. § 1350, 37 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1263 (1980).
10. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 790 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("As best
as we can tell, the aim of section 1350 was to place in federal courts actions
potentially implicating foreign affairs."); Dickinson, The Law of Nations as
Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 48 (1952).
But cf. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 9, at 54 n.3 ("It could be argued that
§ 1350 was originally intended principally to give aliens access to federal court
to sue the United States government or United States state governments or
their agents for torts committed in violation of 'the law of nations or a treaty
to which the United States is a party,' but there were other vehicles by which
aliens might sue the United States for its intentional delicts, making § 1350 su-
perfluous."). The Second Circuit, in holding that the foreign relations implica-
tions of the issues raised in a § 1350 case would have to be adjudicated on
remand, asserted that its decision to remand "underscores the wisdom of the
First Congress in vesting jurisdiction over such claims in the federal district
courts .... Questions of this nature are fraught with implications for the na-
tion as a whole, and therefore should not be left to the potentially varying ad-
judications of the courts of the fifty states." See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. For example, Judge Robert Bork, a member of the three-judge panel
in Tel-Oren, speculates that § 1350's original purpose was to provide a private
cause of action to individuals for the historic offenses against the law of na-
tions-piracy, violations of safe conducts, and infringement of the rights of am-
bassadors. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring) (citing 4 W.
BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *68, 72, quoted in 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 459 (1953)); see also
Note, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 236, 256 (1982-1983) (suggesting that the Alien Tort Claims Act pro-
vides a private right of action for violations of the law of nations or of
treaties).
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only four12 of nearly a dozen cases that raised the issue.'3 In
deciding whether to grant section 1350 jurisdiction, courts must
first determine whether the tort alleged constitutes a violation
of international law.14 Thus, those cases in which the plaintiffs
have failed to obtain section 1350 jurisdiction apparently did
not involve either a violation of a universally recognized princi-
ple of international law or conduct considered wrong by inter-
national agreement.15
One of the few cases granting jurisdiction under the Act
arose only six years after the Act's passage. In Bolchos v. Dar-
rel,16 a federal district court in South Carolina recognized sec-
tion 1350 jurisdiction as an alternative to admiralty jurisdiction.
During a war between France and Spain, Bolchos, a French cit-
izen, seized a Spanish-registered enemy ship and brought its
neutral cargo to an American port. The district court found
12. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); de Blake v. Re-
public of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT(MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984)
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v.
Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C.
1795) (No. 1607).
13. See, e.g., Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding
that there is no right under the law of nations granting custody of children to
grandparents over foster parents); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572
F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (holding that the
Alien Tort Claims Act does not provide a jurisdictional basis for a tort action
against an airline, even though the Warsaw Convention provides a cause of ac-
tion, because airline crashes do not violate the law of nations); Dreyfus v. von
Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30-31 (2d Cir.) (finding that a forced sale of property did
not violate the law of nations when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the
acting state and that the law of nations is primarily concerned with the rela-
tionship among nations), cert denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd.,
519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that, in a Luxemburg trust's action
for fraud, conversion, and corporate waste, the Eighth Commandment, "Thou
shalt not steal," is not part of the law of nations); Khedivial Lines, S.A.E. v.
Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that the Act provides
no basis for enjoining picketing by United States seafarers because the law of
nations accords no universal right to unimpeded access to harbors); Lopes v.
Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (holding that un-
seaworthiness of a vessel is a tort, but not one that violates international law);
Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942, 947-48 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (holding
that a suit for restitution of property and for damages is not a suit for a "tort
only" within the meaning of the Alien Tort Claims Act).
14. The Second Circuit has specified when a wrong will be deemed a vio-
lation of international law: "It is only where the nations of the world have
demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by
means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized be-
comes an international law violation within the meaning of the statute." See
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980).
15. See supra note 13.
16. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607).
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that international law guaranteed the restoration of property
seized in those circumstances to its neutral owner.17 Because
seizure of property is a tortious act, which in this case also vio-
lated the international principle of neutrality, the court granted
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
Subsequently, in Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift,1 8 a
modern court found that there existed an international princi-
ple that bars tampering with passports. 19 The court then con-
cluded that the tortious conduct, the taking of a minor child by
one parent from the legal custody of the other and the subse-
quent concealment of that child's identity on the noncustodial
parent's passport, violated international law. The court, how-
ever, required not only that the alleged tort be found to violate
international law, but also that the plaintiff base its claim on a
substantive right arising under domestic tort law. Thus, to
reach its result, the court had to conclude that the unlawful
taking of the child constituted a domestic tort.20
The most significant contribution to the jurisprudence of
section 1350 jurisdiction was Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.21 Dr. Joel
Filartiga and his daughter, Dolly, both Paraguayan citizens,
brought a wrongful death action in federal district court against
the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, who
then resided in the United States. The plaintiffs claimed that
Dr. Filartiga's son had been tortured to death in retaliation for
17. See icd at 811.
18. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). The plaintiff, a Lebanese national re-
siding in Iran, brought an action against his former wife, an Iraqi national who
was a permanent resident of the United States, for wrongfully withholding
custody of their daughter. See id at 859.
19. See ici at 864-65. The court's approach defined the existence of an in-
ternational law by determining that it had been violated: "'[I]f the thing made
punishable is one which the United States are required by their international
obligations to use due diligence to prevent, it is an offense against the law of
nations.'" Id at 864 (quoting United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488
(1887)).
20. See id at 862-63.
The most recent § 1350 case, de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV
82-1772-RMT(MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed i-
brary, Dist file), sheds little light on the meaning of the Alien Tort Claims
Act. The Sidermans, Argentine nationals living in the United States, brought
suit against the Argentine government for the taking of property, torture of
one of the spouses, and loss of consortium of the other. The court held that
the act of state doctrine barred the claims for the taking of property, but it
awarded $2.6 million damages for the torture and loss of consortium. The
court, in ruling that torture violated international law, did not explain its
holding.
21. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Filartiga's criticism of the Paraguayan government. 22 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's finding of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held that deliberate tor-
ture perpetrated under color of official authority violates cus-
tomary international law.23 The court reiterated that the
threshold question in establishing subject matter jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Claims Act is whether the alleged tor-
tious conduct violates the "law of nations." 24 The court recog-
nized that torture perpetrated by public officers2 is renounced
by virtually all nations.26 It then reasoned that because inter-
national law confers a right upon all persons to be free from
such torture,27 the plaintiffs met the section 1350 jurisdictional
requirements. On remand, Pena defaulted and the Filartigas
were awarded compensatory and punitive damages of $10 mil-
lion in an attempt to "make clear the depth of the international
22. See id. at 878-79.
23. See id. at 884-85. Custom and treaties are the primary sources of in-
ternational law. Treaties are legally binding without domestic implementing
legislation when they are so intended and the language explicitly codifies that
intent. Customary international law, by contrast, is a legally effective set of
norms developed through repeated, uncontested conduct by a majority of
states. See generally 1 J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HIsTORICAL PER-
SPECTVE 31-47 (1968) (discussing the concept and uses of customary interna-
tional law). Customary international law is generally "ascertained by
consulting the works of jurists ... ; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). The law of nations has
been incorporated into federal common law since the ratification of the Con-
stitution in 1789. Thus, the enactment of the Alien Tort Claims Act was au-
thorized by article III. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. For a historical
understanding of this concept, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrUTION 223
(1972); Dickinson, supra note 10, at 48.
24. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. The terms law of nations and custom-
ary international law are used interchangeably throughout this Comment.
25. The international definition of torture is
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public of-
ficial on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or confession, punishing him for an act he has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him
or other persons.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91-92, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975) (adopted without dis-
sent by the United Nations General Assembly), reprinted in Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 882 n.11.
26. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883-84.
27. See id at 880.
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revulsion against torture."28
The district court in Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Re-
public 29 dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under both the Alien Tort Claims Act and
section 1331, the federal question provision.3 0 The district court
used the same analysis for both claims of jurisdiction because it
considered the statutes to be functionally equivalent, at least
"as to the role of the law of nations. ' 31 In rejecting federal
question jurisdiction, the court stated that a private cause of ac-
tion could not be implied from the criminal statutes cited by
the plaintiffs.32 The district court also rejected the claim that a
federal question existed because the domestic federal common
law, from which the court could imply a cause of action, incor-
porates treaties and other evidence of customary international
law.33 The court reasoned that it could not imply a cause of ac-
tion under international law without interfering in the area of
foreign policy making.34 It therefore concluded that only trea-
28. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
Judge Nickerson, who had originally dismissed the complaint for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, allowing Pena to leave the country, granted the Filar-
tigas punitive and compensatory damages of $10 million "to reflect adherence
to the world community's proscription of torture and to attempt to deter its
practice." See id at 867.
29. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), affd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). A plaintiff wishing to obtain federal ques-
tion jurisdiction must present a colorable claim arising under the Constitution
or federal law that is neither frivolous nor interposed solely for the purpose of
obtaining federal jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); infra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
31. See Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549 n.2.
32. See id at 545. The court relied on Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in
holding that Congress had not intended for the criminal statutes invoked by
the plaintiffs to provide protection for the plaintiffs' civil wrong. The court,
therefore, refused to imply a private cause of action for violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 956 (1982) (conspiracy to injure property of a foreign government), § 957
(possession of property in aid of a foreign government), § 966 (expedition
against friendly nation), and §§ 1651-1661 (piracy and privateering). See Tel-
Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 545.
33. See Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 545; supra note 23.
34. See Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 548. The court presumably meant that
because the executive branch purposefully negotiated for the precise language
of the treaties, judicial expansion of that language to create a private cause of
action could contravene executive branch policy.
The court noted that ratification by the Senate of international agree-
ments has occasionally stalled because of provisions for private rights of ac-
tion. See id at 549 (citing Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 9, at 71-72 n.82;
Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v.
Pefia-Irala 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 359 (1981)). One commentator has observed
1985]
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ties expressly granting a private remedy satisfy the criteria for
federal question jurisdiction and that the treaties cited by the
plaintiffs lacked the requisite language creating an express
cause of action.35 The district court used similar reasoning in
rejecting the plaintiffs' claim for jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Claims Act.3 6
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the action in
a short per curiam opinion. Each judge also wrote a separate
opinion. Although disagreeing in analysis, each judge arrived at
the conclusion that the granting of this type of jurisdiction over
aliens would reverberate worldwide as an invitation to numer-
ous undesirable lawsuits.
Judge Bork adopted the district court's analysis,37 agreeing
that a plaintiff must allege a private right to sue granted by in-
ternational law in order to secure jurisdiction under section
1350. Finding that customary international law, the treaties
cited by the plaintiffs, and section 1350 itself did not impliedly
or expressly provide the requisite cause of action, Judge Bork
concluded that jurisdiction under section 1350 was lacking.38
Judge Bork justified the requirement that a private right
to sue be provided under international law by emphasizing that
the judiciary should safeguard the separation of powers and re-
frain from interfering with the political branches. 39 Judge
Bork implied that when cases raise potentially "sensitive" polit-
ical issues the standard should be stricter; not only must a
plaintiff find a cause of action in another statute or law, the
remedy must be expressly stated.40 He thus rejected the Tel-
that "[in the United States, for example, an international agreement banning
genocide has gone unratified chiefly because the Senate did not want to expose
American citizens to suits in foreign countries." Comment, Torture as a Tort
in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV.
353, 359 (1981) (footnote omitted), quoted in Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549.
35. See Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549; infra notes 41-42 and accompanying
text.
36. See Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 549.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 29-36.
38. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
39. See 726 F.2d at 801-08 (Bork, J., concurring).
40. Judge Bork's standard sprang from his concern that
[t]he lack of clarity in, and absence of consensus about, the legal prin-
ciples invoked by appellants, together with the political context of
challenged actions ... .lead to the conclusion that appellants' case is
not the sort that is appropriate for federal-court adjudication, at least
not without an express grant of a cause of action.
See id. at 808 (Bork, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Judge Bork was partic-
ularly concerned that a judicial pronouncement on the PLO's liability for its
[Vol. 70:211
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Oren plaintiffs' argument that a cause of action should be im-
plied from treaties of the United States, 41 reasoning that imply-
ing a cause of action from non-self-executing treaties42 would
intrude on the executive branch's power to negotiate treaties.
Judge Bork also asserted that, in the absence of an express
grant of a remedy, customary international law does not allow
individuals to enforce rights in international or domestic fora.43
Any other construction would be contrary to the "severe limita-
tions on individually initiated enforcement inherent in interna-
tional law... [as well as] to constitutional limits on the role of
attack on the Israeli bus would disrupt the precarious relations between the
United States and the Arab nations. See id at 805 (Bork, J., concurring). He
noted that even the appellants asserted that "'[o]ne of the primary purposes of
the March 11 attack was to sabotage the foreign relations of the United States
and its negotiations by destroying the positive efforts made in the Camp David
accords.'" See i&. (Bork, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Appellants at 15,
Filartiga).
41. Of the "treaties of the United States" that the plaintiffs relied on,
Judge Bork stated that the only relevant human rights treaties were those
binding on the United States: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; U.N.
CHARTER art. 1 & 2, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993; Convention Re-
specting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
T.S. No. 539 (Hague Conventions); Convention with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403. See Tel-
Oren, 726 F.2d at 808 (Bark, J., concurring).
42. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808-10 (Bork, J., concurring). Whether a
treaty or international agreement is binding as part of domestic United States
law depends on whether it is self-executing or non-self-executing. This is de-
cided by the executive during negotiations or by the courts in interpreting the
language of the agreement and its negotiating history. See RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 141, 147, 154 (1965). If the
court finds that the signatories intended that the agreement be internationally
binding and have effect as domestic law without the enactment of implement-
ing legislation, it is self-executing. If the court finds, however, that the signa-
tories intended that the agreement have effect within their respective states at
some future date, after it has become internationally binding and after domes-
tic implementing legislation has been enacted, then the agreement is non-self-
executing. The language of international agreements is often ambiguous with
respect to this issue of intent, leading to different judicial interpretations.
Compare Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (holding the English
version of an 1819 treaty with Spain to be non-self-executing) with United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833) (holding the Spanish version
of the same treaty to be self-executing). Judge Bork asserted that several of
the treaties relied on by the plaintiffs expressly called for implementing legis-
lation, evidencing the intent that the treaties not be self-executing. See Tel-
Oren, 726 F.2d at 809 (Bork, J., concurring).
43. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816-19 (Bork, J., concurring).
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federal courts." Judge Bork concluded that construing sec-
tion 1350 to cover tort actions by aliens that affect foreign pol-
icy would require an act of Congress or a treaty expressly
creating a cause of action.45
In his opinion, Judge Robb skirted the jurisdictional issue
by declaring that Tel-Oren raised a political question and there-
fore was not justiciable.46 He opined that the federal courts are
not equipped to determine the international status of terrorist
acts.47 Because some of the issues raised in Tel-Oren, such as
recognition of states and the apprehension of terrorists, tradi-
tionally have been dealt with by the executive and legislative
branches, 48 Judge Robb thought that the judiciary should defer
to those with expertise and greater access to the relevant
facts.49 He concluded by expressing the fear that seems to un-
derlie each of the opinions: "It is not implausible that every al-
leged victim of violence of ... counter-revolutionaries ...
could argue ... that they are entitled to their day in the courts
of the United States . .. [without] obvious or subtle limiting
principle[s] in sight." 50
Judge Edwards eschewed the district court's proposition
that section 1350 required an independent cause of action,
favoring instead the statutory interpretation, developed in
Bolchos,51 Adra,52 and Filartiga,5 3 that the alleged tort need
only constitute a violation of international law in order to pro-
vide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In applying the
44. See id at 812 (Bork, J., concurring).
45. See id. at 822 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork suggested that even
if such a statute were passed, he might conclude that "the constitutional core
of the political question doctrine precludes jurisdiction." See id. (Bork, J.,
concurring).
46. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
47. See id (Robb, J., concurring).
48. Judge Robb observed that the issues raised by the Tel-Oren plaintiffs
are regularly encountered by the other branches of the federal government.
See id at 825 (Robb, J., concurring) (citing authorities).
49. See id. at 825-26 (Robb, J., concurring).
50. See id at 826 (Robb, J., concurring). Judge Bork agreed that the
plaintiffs' construction of § 1350 was too sweeping because "[i]t would author-
ize tort suits for the vindication of any international legal right. ... That
result would be inconsistent with the severe limitations on individually initi-
ated enforcement inherent in international law itself." See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d
at 812 (Bork, J., concurring).
51. 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); see supra notes 16-17 and accom-
panying text.
52. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); see supra notes 18-20 and accompany-
ing text.
53. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
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principles of Filartiga, however, Judge Edwards found the facts
of Tel-Oren insufficient to establish jurisdiction under section
1350.5 In particular, he noted that the perpetrator of the al-
leged tort was not a sovereign state or its agent, but rather the
PLO. Because he believed that the law of nations relied on in
Filartiga imputes liability only to states and persons acting
under color of state law,55 Judge Edwards refused to find that
the actions of the PLO, however tortious, triggered section 1350
jurisdiction.5 6
Although the Tel-Oren decision was unanimous, the judges
expressed sharp differences about how to deal with the difficult
issues raised by the case. The result, a striking absence of
agreement on any issue but the disposition, diminishes the
value of the case as an interpretation of the jurisdictional re-
quirements of section 1350. Tel-Oren is a hastily formed reac-
tion to the incorrect assumption that Filartiga's broad holding
will beckon to aliens around the world to litigate their claims in
United States federal courts. Because it offers so little gui-
dance, Tel-Oren should be ignored. Instead, courts should ad-
here to the restrictive principles unanimously agreed on in
Filartiga as a guide to understanding the Alien Tort Claims
Act.57
The most dangerous aspect of Tel-Oren as precedent is
Judge Bork's assertion that section 1350 requires an independ-
54. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).
55. See id at 776, 792 (Edwards, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Judge Ed-
wards noted that some modern commentators assume or argue that individu-
als are liable under international law. See i&i at 792-93 (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (citing and discussing authorities).
56. Judge Edwards provided an alternative formulation of § 1350,
although he admitted that this "formulation also raises a host of complex
problems of its own." See id. at 782 (Edwards, J., concurring). He reasoned
that in order for an alien to bring a common law tort action in federal court, a
violation of international law must be alleged and "the substantive right on
which [the] action is based must be found in the domestic tort law of the
United States." See id (Edwards, J., concurring). This formulation was de-
rived from Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
See supra text accompanying notes 18-20. Judge Edwards hypothesized that
the Tel-Oren "plaintiffs might have alleged that the PLO violated Israeli immi-
gration laws by landing in Israel without passports," see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
788 (Edwards, J., concurring), presumably implicating both municipal and in-
ternational law.
57. The Second Circuit's approach to subject matter jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Claims Act as articulated in Filartiga is consistent with earlier de-
cisions construing the statute. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
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ent cause of action.58 On its face, section 1350 states only the
two requirements that there be a "tort only" and that the com-
mission of such a tort violate international law.5 9 Section 1350
contains no explicit requirement that a specific international
law grant a private cause of action in order to establish a right
to redress, probably because the "tort only" language provides
the private right of action. Judge Bork's examination of the
congressional intent underlying section 1350 therefore was un-
necessary because the statutory language is unambiguous on its
face.60
The contrast between the language creating subject matter
jurisdiction in the federal courts in sections 1350 and 1331 fur-
ther undermines Judge Bork's conclusion that section 1350 re-
quires a separate cause of action. Section 1331 provides that
"[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions wherein the matter in controversy ... arises under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."61 The
term "arising under" traditionally has been interpreted to
mean that the source of a plaintiff's right to sue must be ex-
pressly provided for in another law, treaty, or constitutional
provision.62 Section 1350 does not require that the alleged tort
"arise under" an international treaty or customary interna-
58. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring); supra text accom-
panying notes 37-38.
59. See supra text accompanying note 7.
60. Judge Bork believed that had it foreseen the possibility, Congress un-
doubtedly would have explicitly prohibited use of § 1350 in Tel-Oren-type liti-
gation. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812-16 (Bork, J., concurring); supra text
accompanying note 11; cf. 726 F.2d at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("While
conceding that the legislative history offers no hint of congressional intent in
passing the statute, [Judge Bork] infers Congress' intent from the law of na-
tions at the time of the passage of section 1350. The result of this analytical
approach is to avoid the dictates of the [Supreme Court] and to limit the 'law
of nations' language to its 18th century definition.").
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
62. For discussion of the meaning and scope of "arising under," see H.
HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 844-
87 (2d ed. 1973); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 157, 160-63 (1953); supra note 30; see also Oneida Indian Na-
tion v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974) (allowing a suit under the
Nonintercourse Act of 1790, which protects possessory rights to tribal lands);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 696
(1963) (holding that a suit to enforce an award of an airline system board ad-
justment arises under the federal Railway Labor Act); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 805-08 (1824) (holding that a congressio-
nally chartered bank's capacity to sue or be sued arises under federal law
within the meaning of the Constitution); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 379 (1821) (stating that a case that arises under the laws of the United
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tional law, but only that it be committed "in violation of" such
law. In 1948, Congress had an opportunity while reviewing the
jurisdictional provisions to revise the language of section 1350,63
the meaning and use of which was, by then, quite familiar.6"
Congress nonetheless chose to leave section 1350 unchanged,
strongly suggesting that Congress did not intend section 1350 to
require a separate cause of action.65
Judge Bork's analysis violates another rule of statutory
construction by construing a section of the Alien Tort Claims
Act out of existence.6 6 As a general rule, international law
does not state express causes of action6 7 but rather, out of re-
spect for domestic sovereignty, relegates to individual states the
States must involve a right given by some act that becomes necessary in order
to execute powers of the Constitution).
63. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1350, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)).
64. Section 1331 was promulgated in 1789. By 1948, Congress was well-
acquainted with the judiciary's conclusion that "arising under" required an ex-
press cause of action. Therefore, had Congress intended the same meaning for
§ 1350, it could have changed the language when it reviewed the Act in 1948.
By leaving the language untouched, Congress presumably intended to main-
tain the different standards.
65. An interesting analysis contrasting the differences between §§ 1350
and 1331 is found in Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). Just
before the fall of South Vietnam, the United States airlifted several thousand
Vietnamese orphans to the United States. The grandmother of four of these
children brought suit to have the children returned to her custody. In examin-
ing the claims for jurisdiction, the court denied jurisdiction under § 1331 on
the ground that the treaty invoked by the plaintiff did not expressly create a
cause of action for aliens in federal courts. See id at 629. The court also re-
jected § 1350 jurisdiction but did so on the ground that the granting of custody
to foster parents instead of grandparents did not violate the law of nations.
See id.; see also Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328
(E.D. Pa. 1966) ("Once a tort can be considered to be in violation of the law of
nations, § 1350 allows immediate access to a federal court."). In Abdul-
Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), the court ob-
served that the action was grounded directly on a domestic tort-the unlawful
taking of a minor child from its guardian-but it also implicated an interna-
tional law-the misuse of a passport. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying
text. Under this approach, the court did not have to decide whether § 1350 re-
quires a separate cause of action because, fortuitously, the cause of action re-
lied upon was expressly provided in domestic tort law.
66. It is a basic principle of statutory construction that no part of a statute
should be construed so as to render it "inoperative or superfluous, void or in-
significant." 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06,
at 63 (4th ed. 1973); see FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., Miami Branch Of-
fice, 515 F.2d 988, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
67. See L. HENIN, supra note 23, at 224; C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 729 n.5 (2d rev.
ed. 1945).
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decision of whether to grant a private cause of action to remedy
violations of international law.68 Under Judge Bork's reading
of the Act, no plaintiff will ever be able to prove a right to sue
under customary international law, a construction that effec-
tively nullifies that portion of section 1350.
Although Judge Bork's objective in Tel-Oren was to stiffen
the requirements for access to the federal courts, a close exami-
nation of the holding of Filartiga reveals that the Second Cir-
cuit's standard was not overly lax. The court in Filartiga held
that because torture perpetrated under state authority violates
international law, aliens who are victims of this tort were enti-
tled to section 1350 jurisdiction.69 The simplicity of this holding
need not lead to its overly broad application. First, in order to
constitute the requisite violation of international law under the
test set out in Filartiga, the tortious act must be "official,"' 0
that is, an act conducted by the state, its agent, or under "color
of state law."'71 Second, Filartiga's holding identifies only tor-
ture as an actionable violation of international law. Terrorism,
often differing from torture only in semantics in the western
world,72 is not proscribed by a general consensus in the interna-
tional community.73 Finally, the Filartiga court construed the
68. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 42, § 3 comment h, illustration 5 (ob-
serving that municipal law may provide a remedy to a person injured by a vio-
lation of a rule of international law).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
70. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (1980) (concluding that
"official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations").
71. In limiting its recognition of torture as a violation of international law
to official acts, the court only acknowledged that official torture is universally
condemned. See supra note 25; cf. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 ("Paraguay's re-
nunciation of torture as a legitimate instrument of state policy, however, does
not strip the tort of its character as an international law violation, if it in fact
occurred under color of government authority.") (citations omitted).
72. For example, it could be argued that among the PLO's activities were
some incidents of torture and arbitrary killing, such as setting fire to the bus
while passengers were bound to their seats. See supra note 1. The delineation
between torture and terrorism on the ground that terrorism is an instrument
of political negotiation and torture merely conduct done without reason by a
nonstate actor is an affront to the principles of human rights. Such reasoning
mandates the conclusion that terrorists who torture victims of an enemy state
for the advancement of political goals are exempt from liability. Terrorists
would guarantee their safety by perpetrating other acts in addition to the tor-
ture, so as to hide the acts of torture under the liability-free cloak of terror-
ism. If the allegations regarding the torture and arbitrary killing of the
victims can be proved, the distinction between terrorism and torture in Tel-
Oren is specious. Cf. Note, supra note 11, at 243-47 (urging courts to rule that
terrorism violates international law).
73. This is largely a result of the debate between the developing countries
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statutory reference to the "law of nations" narrowly, noting
that very few types of conduct have been proscribed widely
enough to have evolved into principles of customary interna-
tional law.7 4 Because the list of crimes is short and restrictive,
the Tel-Oren court's fear that section 1350 jurisdiction would be
conferred readily on an alien citing any international precept is
exaggerated.
The District of Columbia court had no need to depart from
the framework of analysis developed in Filartiga in analyzing
whether the PLO acted under color of state law. On the one
hand, a strict application of Filartiga's requirement that the act
be "official" supports Judge Edwards's finding that the PLO
was a nonstate actor and therefore incapable of violating the
prohibition recognized in customary international law against
official torture. On the other hand, had Judge Edwards ex-
plored the possibility that by acting as an agent of the Libyan
government the PLO was acting under color of state law, he
might have viewed the PLO's conduct as "official" and there-
fore within the Filartiga principle. The PLO acted as an agent
for the Libyan government if the latter authorized the PLO to
act on Libya's behalf and subject to its control and if the PLO
had consented so to act.75 In deciding whether an agency rela-
tionship exists, courts try to discern the intent of the parties
based on facts, such as the control of the principal over the
agent, the method, if any, of remuneration, and the nature of
and the industrial nations concerning an acceptable definition of terrorism.
The United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism reached
an impasse over the definition of terrorism and the scope of the proposed con-
vention condemning terrorism. Certain countries were particularly concerned
about the convention's potential impact on national liberation groups. See
Nanda, Progress Report on the United Nations'Attempt To Draft An "Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages", 6 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 89, 89,
96 (1979). These countries consider politically motivated acts of terrorism to
be legitimate acts of aggression and therefore immune from condemnation. Cf.
Basic principles of the legal status of the combatants struggling against colo-
nial and alien domination and racist r~gimes, G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 30). at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973) (supporting the struggles
against such regimes) [hereinafter cited as Basic principles]; see also Blum &
Steinhardt, supra note 9, at 92 (suggesting that one indication of the lack of
international consensus about terrorism is that accusations are often answered
with a justification for, rather than a denial of, the act).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88.
75. An agency relationship is "the fiduciary relation which results from
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act
on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958).
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the past relationship of the parties.76 The complaint 77 in Tel-
Oren asserted that the Libyan government planned, funded,
and claimed responsibility for the attack" that later formed the
basis of the Israeli plaintiffs' claim of tortious conduct in viola-
tion of international law. If the PLO carried out Libya's in-
structions with the use of Libyan funds, it was arguably
operating as an agent79 under color of state law.80 It is possible,
76. See id. at § 1 commentary at 9; see also id. at §§ 12-14(0).
77. Because the merits of the case had not been heard by the court, the
agency theory depends on the facts alleged in the pleadings. Without passing
on the validity of the facts, a court can exercise jurisdiction "[i]f the pleadings
contain sufficient matter to challenge the attention of the court, and such a
case is thereby presented as to authorize the court to deliberate and act."
Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 89 F.2d 652, 655 (8th Cir. 1937). Further-
more, jurisdiction does not depend on the sufficiency of the pleadings or char-
acter of the defense; jurisdiction "is wanting only where the claim set forth in
the complaint is so insubstantial as to be frivolous or, in other words, is plainly
without color of merit." Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291, 305-06
(1923) (citations omitted). Thus, the court in Tel-Oren would not have had to
adjudge the liability of the PLO as an agent of Libya in order to find § 1350
jurisdiction; it would have needed only to find credible allegations that the
PLO was acting as agent of Libya and, therefore, under color of state law.
78. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring); see also E. MICKO-
LUS, TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM, 1968-1979, at 778 (1980) (describing the
attack).
79. This analysis inevitably leads to the question whether, if the PLO was
acting as an agent of a sovereign government, it can claim immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982). For a discus-
sion of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, see infra notes 113-19 and accom-
panying text.
80. Although not considered by the court, the PLO arguably could be held
liable as a group of individuals, as opposed to a state. Historically, only states
were considered actors and therefore subject to liability under international
law. The protection of individuals generally had been left to each sovereign
state by way of bilateral or multilateral agreements. The Individual's Duties
to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1, U.N. Sales No.
E.82.XIV.1 (1982). The international community first attributed liability to in-
dividuals in the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the
Charter of the Nfirnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1, at
188 (1947) (affirming "the principles of international law recognized by the
Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal").
Shortly thereafter, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, expanded the Nu-
remberg concept of crimes against humanity and defined the liability for such
crimes. See A. KLAFKOwsKI, THE NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES AND THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1966). Subsequent international agreements
demonstrate the growing international consensus that individuals, at least in
the area of human rights, bear responsibility for certain actions. See, e.g., In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) ("Realizing that the
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therefore, that the Tel-Oren court possessed facts sufficient to
grant subject matter jurisdiction under section 1350. Regard-
less of the conclusion that it reached, the Tel-Oren court should
have used the framework developed in Filartiga to avoid instil-
ling superfluous meaning in the Alien Tort Claims Act.
A second limiting element of the Filartiga court's holding
is its premise that only torture, and not terrorism, violates in-
ternational law. In applying this distinction, the Tel-Oren court
could have considered whether any aspect of the alleged treat-
ment of the plaintiffs fit within the definition of torture8' that
was used as the basis for section 1350 jurisdiction in Filartiga.
The Filartiga court's definition excludes terrorism, a political
activity that is not yet condemned by the international commu-
nity.8 2 Acts of terrorism, no matter how heinous, that cannot
individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which
he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and obser-
vance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant ... .") (emphasis
omitted); id, at art. 5, para. 1 ("Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter-
preted as implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms recognized herein.. . .")(emphasis added); The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) ("Every-
one has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development
of his personality is possible.").
Likewise, several domestic courts have recognized individual responsibil-
ity. See, e.g., Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D.
Pa. 1963) (defining a violation of the law of nations as "at least a violation by
one or more individuals"); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857
(D. Md. 1961) (holding an individual liable for violating the law of nations).
An alternative way to circumvent this controversy is to characterize the
PLO as a quasi-state. Partial statehood would bear with it at least partial re-
sponsibility to the international community. See Kassim, The Palestine Libera-
tion Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International
Law, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1980). The PLO's status as an actor in inter-
national law is based on four factors: self-proclamation as sole and legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people; diplomatic recognition by other
states; membership in governmental organizations; and governmental author-
ity in war situations, extraditions, and tax collections. See id. at 18-25. The
natural conclusion of Professor Kassim's postulate is that if the PLO claims all
the advantages born from a quasi-state status under international law, it must
also accept liability for breaches of the same laws. For background and fur-
ther discussion of the status of the PLO in the international community, see
Friedlander, The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Annis Kassim, 10
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221 (1981); Levine, A Landmark on the Road to Legal
Chaos: Recognition of the PLO as a Menace to World Public Order, 10 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 243 (1981).
81. See supra note 25. But see supra note 72.
82. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795-96 (Edwards, J., concurring). But see
Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and
Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law under the FSIA and
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be characterized as official torture will not survive Filartiga's
interpretation of section 1350. For example, the bombing of
buildings, the seizure and arbitrary detention of hostages, and
border blockades are all actions that would fall outside a strict
reading of Filartiga.8 3 Perpetrators of such acts may, of course,
be held criminally liable, but their victims will not be able to
gain access to United States courts by asserting section 1350
jurisdiction.
A third limiting factor of Filartiga is its narrow interpreta-
tion of the scope of customary international law for purposes of
determining which tortious acts are "committed in violation of
the law of nations." Judge Kaufman concluded that customary
international law contains only those precepts that are sub-
scribed to by a general consensus of the international commu-
nity.84 Writing for the court, Judge Kaufman cited piracy and
slave trading as traditionally recognized violations of the law of
nations.8 5 Other courts interpreting section 1350 included tam-
pering with passports,8 6 seizure of a neutral's goods,8 7 and offi-
cial torture.8 8 Because the defendant state and its allies most
likely will deny the precept's place in customary law,89 this re-
quirement may reduce the number of claims based on a univer-
the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191 (1983); Note, supra note 11, at
243-47.
83. A less strict reading of Filartiga might allow a finding that these ter-
rorist acts were "official" because of Libyan participation in the planning of
the attack. See Comment, Jurisdiction-private right of action under the law
of nations-suject matter jurisdiction under Alien Tort Claims Act-separa-
tion of powers: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 668, 670
(1984).
84. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888; supra note 14.
85. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890; see also Dickinson, supra note 10, at 26-
34 (discussing the law of nations as it existed in the eighteenth century).
86. See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961);
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
87. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); supra
text accompanying note 17.
88. See de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT(MCx)
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); supra
note 20.
89. Developing nations as a block, for example, probably would deny that
government expropriation of an alien's property is a violation of international
law. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S 398 (1964) (finding no
consensus in the international law governing the expropriation of alien prop-
erty). Judge Edwards also suggested that nations struggling under alien domi-
nation might join together to declare legitimate acts that lead to independence
and self-determination. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring)
(citing Basic principles, supra note 73).
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sally accepted rule of international law.9 0
The Tel-Oren court thus had three grounds on which to re-
ject or accept the plaintiffs' claims without departing from Fi-
lartiga's interpretation of section 1350 jurisdiction. Instead, by
resorting to the innovative analyses of the three separate opin-
ions, the judges in the Tel-Oren panel revealed their fear that
following Filartiga and granting section 1350 jurisdiction would
result in a deluge of alien tort claims. This fear is unfounded,
however, because of the procedural hurdles built into the do-
mestic legal system, such as the doctrines of personal jurisdic-
tion, forum non conveniens, the act of state doctrine, and
foreign sovereign immunity.9 1 A final limiting factor, subject to
the most misuse because of its discretionary nature, is the polit-
ical question doctrine. Although not all of these factors could
have been applied in Tel-Oren and Filartiga, they could operate
to filter future tort claims of alien plaintiffs seeking access to
the United States courts.
The requirement of due process carefully delineates the
parties over whom personal jurisdiction constitutionally may be
exercised.9 2 In a case involving only alien parties, personal ju-
90. Courts in the past also have construed the scope of the "law of na-
tions" narrowly, finding that no international rights are involved in airplane
crashes in international territories, see Benjamins v. British European Air-
ways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), in granting
custody to grandparents rather than foster parents, see Huynh Thi Anh v.
Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978), and in the unseaworthiness of a vessel, see
Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See gen-
erally supra note 13.
91. A less imposing barrier is the requirement of exhaustion of local rem-
edies. It is not yet settled whether the requirement, a general principle of in-
ternational law usually applied in the context of international redress, is only
procedural or is a substantive bar to future claims. Generally, parties must ex-
haust all local remedies by seeking reparation through the courts and adminis-
trative agencies of their own state before proceeding to a foreign forum. If no
local remedies are available or if the procedure is unreasonably slow, the
plaintiff may proceed to alternative fora See generally A. TRINDADE, THE AP-
PLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (1983); Mummery, The Content of the Duty to Exhaust Local
Judicial Remedies, 58 AM. J.INT'L L. 389 (1964). The requirement should be
automatically triggered in § 1350 cases because, by alleging a violation of inter-
national law or a United States treaty, the plaintiff has put the procedural
rules of international law into play.
92. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that the
defendant have at least "minimum contacts" with the forum state. See Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The due process
clause extends to aliens as well as to United States citizens. See R. CASAD, JU-
RISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS: TERRITORIAL BASIS AND PROCESS LIMITATIONs
ON JURISDICTION OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS % 4.06[5] (1983).
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risdiction can be established if the defendant has attachable as-
sets or property in the United States or if the defendant is
physically present in the United States, either permanently or
transitorily. Basing jurisdiction on property that is the subject
of the suit presents no constitutional obstacle.9 3 Quasi in rem
jurisdiction based on the presence of the defendant's property
in the United States with no other connection between the de-
fendant and the United States, however, is more tenuous. If it
can be shown that no other forum exists in the United States
and that the plaintiff would suffer extreme hardship if required
to litigate in a foreign country, a court might exercise quasi in
rem jurisdiction over the defendant based only on property in
the United States.9 4
Physical presence in the United States falls well within the
due process requirements of personal jurisdiction 95 and there-
fore there is no barrier to the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over an alien defendant sojourning at length in the United
States.96 A more constitutionally tenuous, yet permissible,
claim is for personal jurisdiction over a defendant only transito-
rily present in the forum. The "transient rule"97 has been ex-
tensively criticized, causing courts generally to restrict its use
to suits against aliens.98 Thus, in section 1350 cases, a defend-
93. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1977).
94. In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court ex-
tended the standard of fair play and substantial justice set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945), to quasi in rem
jurisdiction. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212. Although International Shoe re-
quires minimum contacts with the forum state, the Court in Shaffer reserved
the question whether an exception might be made if no other forum is avail-
able. See id. at 211 n.37; cf. Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F.
Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977) (allowing a Connecticut plaintiff to obtain in rem
jurisdiction by garnishing a debt owed to the defendant, a Kuwait corporation,
by a Connecticut corporation because the defendant was not more disadvan-
taged by litigating in Connecticut than in any other state and because there
were no alternative fora in the United States).
95. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
96. Pena remained in the United States after his visitor visa had expired.
While in custody pending deportation, he was served with the Filartiga com-
plaint. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878-79.
97. The "transient rule" allows personal jurisdiction over defendants by
physical service of process regardless of the lack of contact with the forum.
See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. REv. 289, 289 (1956); Ross, The Shift-
ing Basis of Jurisdiction, 17 MiNN. L. REV. 146, 146-47 (1932).
98. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 97, at 303. Professor Albert A.
Ehrenzweig suggested that one rationale for applying the transient rule to
aliens is that plaintiffs who cannot sue the defendant in the United States may
completely lose their remedies. See id. Thus, the alien defendant in Bishop v.
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ant must be at least transitorily present or must own property
in the United States in order to be subject to a federal court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction. In Tel-Oren, personal jurisdic-
tion could have been founded on the extended presence in the
United States of the PLO's Information Office in Washington,
D.C. 9 9
Another jurisdictional limit on the access to United States
courts of alien tort claimants who have established subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under section 1350 is the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, 10 0 which permits a court having subject matter and
personal jurisdiction to choose not to exercise its jurisdiction if
the forum is sufficiently inconvenient. A court may dismiss an
action on forum non conveniens grounds with a stipulation that
the case be reinitiated in the more convenient forum.' 0 ' The
Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1853), was served with process while on a train passing
through Connecticut. The court upheld the service, finding no reason why
Connecticut creditors should have to pursue their debtors in foreign jurisdic-
tions when the debtor is in the plaintiffs jurisdiction.
99. But cf. D'Amato, Judge Bark's Concept of the Law of Nations Is Seri-
ously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 93-94 (1985) (suggesting that the basis
for jurisdiction over the PLO was the presence of money and other assets
owned by the PLO in the United States).
100. Within the United States federal court system, cases may be trans-
ferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982), which provides: "For the convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." If the proposed recipient forum is outside the United States,
thereby making transfer impossible, the court may dismiss the action. See,
e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (dismissing an action be-
cause Scotland, the situs of the airplane crash, was a more appropriate forum).
The purpose of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to allow a court to
decline jurisdiction when the practical aspects of litigating a case indicate that
a more convenient location is necessary to ensure that substantial justice will
be done. Among the factors that different courts have taken into considera-
tion in applying the doctrine are the relative ease of access to sources of proof,
the availability of compulsory process and the cost of obtaining the attendance
of unwilling witnesses, the possibility of viewing the situs, if appropriate, and
the enforceability of a judgment.- On one occasion, demonstrated bias of the
foreign court defeated a motion for dismissal under the forum non conveniens
doctrine. See Phoenix Canada Oil Co., Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445 (D.
Del. 1978). But see Shields v. Mi Ryung Constr. Co., 508 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (dismissing the action on forum non conveniens grounds in favor of
Saudi Arabia, despite the Arizona plaintiff's assertion that the trial would be
unfair because members of the Saudi royal family were parties to the suit and,
consequently, no local attorneys would be available).
101. The dismissal order usually is conditioned upon the defendant's
waiver of statute of limitations defenses and any jurisdictional objections. See
Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities Serv. Co., 650 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir. 1981)
(conditioning the dismissal on the defendant's willingness to accept service of
process in Brazil, to waive any statute of limitations defenses, and to pay any
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defendant's motion1 0 2 must establish not only that a more con-
venient forum exists, but also that the original forum is seri-
ously inconvenient. 10 3 In addition, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens requires that the alternative court be equipped and
willing to administer justice.10 4 A court, for example, probably
would refuse to dismiss a case if it appeared that the officials of
the proposed forum would persecute any of the litigants; 0 5 if
the evidence, witnesses, and litigants were spread among sev-
eral countries; or, perhaps, if the parties resided in a country
without an internationally recognized legal system.
In considering the question of forum non conveniens in Fi-
lartiga, the district court found on remand that it would not be
able to substitute a Paraguayan forum without risk of an unjust
result. Before the Filartigas brought their action in the United
States, they had filed a lawsuit in Paraguay that resulted in the
arrest of their Paraguayan attorney and the threat of his death
if he continued with the suit. 0 6 Had the issue of forum non
conveniens arisen in Tel-Oren, the court may well have found
the Israeli courts equally equipped to administer justice and
more convenient because Israel was close to the parties' resi-
judgment rendered in the Brazilian courts). A court may reserve the power to
reinstate the case if its conditions are not met. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828, at 42 n.13 (Supp.
1984).
102. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 101, at § 3828,
at 180.
103. See id; see also R. CASAD, supra note 92, at 1.04.
104. In addition to convenience, the requirement that the court also be "ef-
fective" serves to protect a plaintiff's right to redress. "It must appear to a cer-
tainty that jurisdiction of all parties can be had and that complete relief can be
obtained in the supposedly more convenient court." 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra note 101, at 179 (footnote omitted). It has been suggested
that heinous violations of human rights, by themselves, may preclude the situs
of the tort as an alternative forum. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 9, at
104.
105. In cases alleging a violation of international law perpetrated by a state
official or an agent of the state in the alternative forum, for example, courts
may be predisposed to retain jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes
106-07.
106. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. The defendant, Pena, brought a motion
to dismiss based on forum non conveniens in the district court. Because the
case had been dismissed solely for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however,
the issue did not come before the Second Circuit. On remand, the district
court noted that Pena's default cast doubt on his argument that the
Paraguayan courts were more convenient. The court retained jurisdiction,
holding that forum non conveniens depends on the availability of justice as
well as convenience and that Pena did not rebut the plaintiffs' argument that
resort to Paraguayan courts would be futile. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.
Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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dences and was the situs of the tort.10 7
Other barriers to alien tort actions include the act of state
doctrine and foreign sovereign immunity.'0 8 The act of state
doctrine has been judicially evolved from the customary inter-
national privilege of sovereign immunity. It precludes courts
from reaching the merits of issues'0 9 that question a foreign
sovereign's public acts committed within that sovereign's terri-
tory."0 The Filartiga court suggested in dicta that when illegal
acts are not ratified by the state, application of the doctrine
may be unjustified."' Moreover, in Tel-Oren, the opinions of
107. No Israeli official or agent of the government was a party to the suit.
Moreover, as demonstrated by the celebrated trial of the convicted war crimi-
nal, Adolf Eichmann, Israel's adversarial legal system provides a relatively ob-
jective forum. See J. STONE, THE EICHMANN TRIAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 14-
17 (1961) (discussing the impartiality of the Israeli court). See generally
6,000,000 ACCUSERS: ISRAEL'S CASE AGAINST EICHMANN 177-305 (S. Rosenne
ed. trans. 1961) (discussing the legal channels for challenging the court's
fairness).
108. For general discussions of these doctrines, see Note, Adjudicating Acts
of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis, 51
FORDHAM L. REv. 722 (1983); Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 933 (1982); Note, Foreign States Sued for Their Acts Abroad: A
Uniform Analysis Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Ac 34 RUTGERS
L. REV. 538 (1982); Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine Wisely: The
Viability of the Act of State Doctrine After the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Ac4 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 547 (1983); Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and
the Act of State: The Need for a Commercial Act Exception to the Commercial
Act Exception, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 763 (1983).
109. Judge Edwards emphasized in Tel-Oren that the act of state doctrine,
unlike foreign sovereign immunity, does not require a court to decline jurisdic-
tion but, rather, requires it to abstain from passing on the merits of certain
issues. Thus, he considered it inappropriate to apply the act of state doctrine
to facts that raised only a jurisdictional question. See Tel Oren, 726 F.2d at 789-
90 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Bork, on the other hand, relied on more
recent formulations of the doctrine and its purpose-to preserve the basic rela-
tionship between the branches of government through the separation of pow-
ers principle-as support for declining to hear the case on political question
grounds. See 726 F.2d at 801-03 (Bork, J., concurring).
110. See Banco Nationale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). In
Sabbatino, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine barred the determination
of the validity under international law of the Cuban government's expropria-
tion of private property. The I-ickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (current version at 22
U.S.C. § 2770(e)(2) (1982)), reversed the Sabbatino holding by allowing courts
to adjudicate claims of expropriation of property in violation of international
law.
111. The court observed: "[W]e doubt whether action by a state official in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly
unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized as an
act of state." Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889; see also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690-95 (1976) (suggesting that abstention on
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Judges Edwards and Bork noted that the doctrine probably
could not be stretched to shield the PLO, whose sovereignty is
questionable and whose acts were committed inside the terri-
tory of an unrelated sovereign government.1' 2
Of greater import is the barrier raised by the doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity,113 codified in the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act (FSIA).:" 4 The FSIA bars actions against
a foreign state and its agencies and instrumentalities unless the
action falls within one of the specified exceptions or the foreign
state waives its immunity."L5 The only exception that is poten-
tially relevant to section 1350 cases, although inapplicable in
both Filartiga and Tel-Oren, precludes immunity for tort claims
in which the injury or death of the plaintiff occurs in the
United States. 1 6 The plaintiffs in Filartiga circumvented the
issue of sovereign immunity by suing an individual, the Inspec-
tor-General of Police, rather than the government of Paraguay.
Similarly, the Tel-Oren court retained jurisdiction only over the
PLO, summarily dismissing the plaintiffs' original claim against
Libya L 7 as barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 81
the basis of the act of state doctrine cannot be triggered by conduct unratified
by the state).
112. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring); 726 F.2d at 802,
803-04, 804 n.9 (Bork, J., concurring).
113. The barrier raised by the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is
more formidable than that raised by the act of state doctrine because, if suc-
cessfully invoked, it bars the suit completely. In contrast, the act of state doc-
trine merely removes from litigation the specific issue of the validity of a
state's acts. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
114. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
115. For example, the statute provides that "a foreign state shall not be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in
any case-(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explic-
itly or by implication." See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982). A state may waive its
immunity explicitly by signing treaties or implicitly by making a general ap-
pearance in court or by agreeing to arbitrate in another country. See Maritime
Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C.
1981) (agreement to arbitrate). One commentator has also suggested that Arti-
cle 56 of the United Nations Charter may waive immunity with respect to vio-
lations of fundamental human rights. See Comment, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and International Human Rights Agreements: How They Co-
Exist, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 71, 82 (1982).
116. The statute provides immunity in any case
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while
acting within the scope of his office or employment ....
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1982).
117. Theoretically, the court could have found that Libya had implicitly
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Thus, in order to surmount the sovereign immunity barrier, a
plaintiff would have to aver either that the "official" tortious
conduct fell within an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act or, when it is in the state's interest to deny a rela-
tionship with the defendant, that there is no agency
relationship without ratification of the act by the state.119
Finally, the political question doctrine' 20 is the most diffi-
cult hurdle to overcome in reaching the federal courts in cases
of this type. The political question doctrine requires that the
judiciary refrain from adjudicating politically sensitive issues
waived its immunity and therefore was subject to liability. In Letelier v. Re-
public of Chile, 488 F. Supp 665 (D.D.C. 1980), for example, the court held that
the FSIA does not shield a foreign state that has ordered its agents to conduct
an assassination or other act of political terrorism in the United States. In dic-
tum, the court implied that the Act does not give foreign states discretion to
commit assassinations or other illegal acts anywhere. See id at 673. Such acts
would include those "dearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as recog-
nized in both national and international law." Id. Thus, the question whether
Libya could be held liable for authorizing the PLO to commit illegal acts of
terrorism in Israel remains unanswered.
118. See supra note 2.
Assuming that the claim against Libya is properly barred by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, one should query whether the agency theory used
to find that the PLO acted under color of state law, see infra text accompany-
ing note 79, will extend Libya's immunity to shield the PLO. According to 28
U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1982), the term "foreign state" includes an agent or instru-
mentality of a foreign state. The statute, however, explicitly excludes those
entities created under the laws of any third country. See § 1603(b)(3) (1982).
The implication is that, in order to be shielded by the FSIA, the PLO would
have to be a Libyan organization. Moreover, although the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act has been applied to individuals who represent a foreign gov-
ernment, such as diplomats, the PLO has not held itself out as Libya's repre-
sentative. Finally, because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act has not
been extended to protect a foreign sovereign from acts committed outside its
territory, it is unlikely that the FSIA would shield the PLO for its acts in
Israel.
119. In order to safeguard its reputation in the international community, a
foreign state whose officials or agents are engaged in lawsuits for human
rights violations may be unwilling to claim responsibility for, or associate itself
in any way with, the suit. The Paraguayan government, for example, actively
denied that Filartiga's son died by torture at the hands of defendant Pena. See
Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 9, at 72 n.83 (citing Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Paraguay, O.A.S. Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, DEA/Ser./P/Ag./doc. 920/78, Apr. 27, 1978, at 26).
120. The political question issue was not raised by either party before the
Tel-Oren courts. Judge Edwards, however, commenting on his colleagues' reli-
ance on "facile labels of abstention or nonjusticiabiity, such as the 'political
question doctrine,"' see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 796 (Edwards, J., concurring),
emphasized that "[n]onjusticiability based upon 'political question' is at best a
limited doctrine, and it is wholly inapposite to this case, see id. (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
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that are traditionally within the ambit of the executive branch,
such as those involving foreign relations.121 The parameters of
the doctrine have remained shadowy,122 rendering it difficult to
check the courts' discretionary application of the doctrine. Be-
cause section 1350 cases always implicate foreign relations by
alleging violations of international law, there may be no way to
stem the automatic application of the political question doc-
trine. Judge Robb, for example, looked immediately to the fact
that questions relating to the activities of terrorists tradition-
ally have been the exclusive domain of the executive and legis-
lative branches in denying the Tel-Oren plaintiffs'
jurisdiction.123
Although its discretionary application may shield the polit-
ical question doctrine from careful scrutiny, such reflex appli-
cation of the doctrine must be challenged. Automatic
application of the doctrine, precluding the consideration of im-
portant countervailing factors, 24 may constitute an unconstitu-
121. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm al Quywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of
Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196,
1201 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that issues as to the right to oil extracted from
the Persian Gulf involved a political question), cert denied, 442 U.S. 928
(1979); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the
challenge to the President's conduct of an unconstitutional war in Indo-China
was a political question because it falls within the President's wide discretion
in conducting the country's foreign affairs); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664,
665 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that a suit by an army private seeking an injunc-
tion blocking the orders sending him to Viet Nam on the ground that the
American military action there was illegal was a political question).
122. The Supreme Court outlined the general boundaries of the doctrine in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962):
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impos-
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's un-
dertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a policy decision already made; or the po-
tentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. For scholarly discussions of the doctrine, see, for example, A.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES,
POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3-48 (1961); Gunther, The Subtle Vices of
the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial
Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
123. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 824-26 (Robb, J., concurring).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 128-35.
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tional abdication of judicial power.ns Congress intended for
the judiciary to address matters of international law, as is evi-
denced by the enactment of a statute that confers jurisdiction
in cases in which a tort violates international law. Abstention
at the mere mention of the politically sensitive nature of inter-
national principles effectively nullifies the Alien Tort Claims
Act. The executive branch also has indicated that legal ques-
tions implicating foreign relations are within the domain of the
judiciary. 26 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has distin-
guished between political questions and mere political cases in
stating that "it is error to suppose that every case or contro-
versy which touches foreign relations is beyond judicial
cognizance."'127
A court, therefore, must look beyond the surface implica-
tions for international relations and decide 12 whether the case
involves issues constitutionally committed to a coordinate
branch of government, whether the resolution of the issues de-
mands expertise beyond the judiciary's capacity, and whether
any prudential considerations counsel against intervention.129
125. See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?,
40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
126. The State Department has commented that it is most appropriate for
the judiciary to decide cases that turn on questions of international law. See
Letter from the Legal Advisor, Dept. of State, to Robert Bork, Solicitor Gen-
eral (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 710-11 (1976).
It also has been suggested that even though a question might be "polit-
ical," the executive branch's deference to the judiciary may achieve a desired
foreign policy objective. In Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259
(D.D.C. 1980), the State Department brought the action as a vehicle for ex-
pressing its displeasure at Chile's unwillingness to extradite the defendants.
Ostensibly, then, the State Department may wish to use the Tel-Oren action to
communicate its commitment to the vindication of human rights. Cf. Holmes
v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1215 (D.C. Cir.) ("Even in controversies affected in
some degree by a treaty with a foreign country... the courts may in a partic-
ular context have a legitimate and useful function to perform."), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 869 (1972).
127. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
128. The Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), that it is the function of the judiciary to decide which of two argua-
bly appropriate branches should be allowed to resolve issues. Justice Brennan
reiterated this view in his dissent in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional
de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). Expressing his disapproval of a "Bernstein let-
ter," see infra note 132, Justice Brennan stated that the executive branch has
no authority to decide which branch resolves political questions. It is the role
of the judiciary to choose the approppriate branch; the executive's" view is ir-
relevant. See 406 U.S. at 790-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). Similarly, in Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th
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Tel-Oren did not require the court to formulate or review an act
of foreign policy, an area that clearly is committed to the exec-
utive branch. Instead, the court was asked to use its judicial ex-
pertise in interpreting and applying a statute, a task far-
removed from the functions of the coordinate branches. Specif-
ically, Tel-Oren required the interpretation and application of
the Alien Tort Claims Act to resolve whether terrorism is pro-
scribed by any international law. At trial, had jurisdiction been
granted, the court would have continued to interpret and apply
appropriate international and domestic laws to the facts in or-
der to determine whether the plaintiffs were entitled to relief.
Admittedly, the rules of international law are not as clearly ar-
ticulated as are those of domestic law, but that is not sufficient
grounds for abstention. The Supreme Court has charged the
federal courts with applying the rules of written and customary
international law in the same way that common-law courts find
and apply municipal rules of decision.130 Courts also must in-
quire whether "prudential considerations"''1 require or fore-
stall adjudication. In measuring the sensitivity of a case, courts
are free to gather information from the State Department,132
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970), the court recognized that the function of
determining whether secrecy is required in the national interest is expressly
assigned to the executive branch. Nonetheless, it defined the judiciary's
proper inquiry as whether "classification [of the material in question] was arbi-
trary or capricious." See 421 F.2d at 933.
130. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). There are ample guide-
lines in the 50 cases since 1952 in which United States courts have dealt with
international human rights issues. See Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in
Enforcing International Human Rights Law, 1980 AMERICAN SOC. OF INT'L
LAW PROCEEDINGS 21; R. LILLiCH, THE ROLE OF DOMEsTIc CoURTS IN THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 66-114 (1964) (describing the role domestic courts
should play in matters of international relations).
131. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
the judgment).
132. Requesting an advisory opinion in the form of an amicus curiae does
not constitute judicial abdication; accepting a binding "Bernstein letter" does.
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The Bernstein doctrine, originating in Bernstein v.
N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375
(2d Cir. 1954), is an exception to the act of state doctrine. It requires that
where the executive branch expressly represents to the court that application
of the act of state doctrine would not advance American foreign policy, the
court may not apply the doctrine. The letter sent from the State Department
was binding. See First National City Bank, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972). In response
to the refusal of the Supreme Court to pierce the sovereign veil in Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, Congress passed the Hickenlooper amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e)(2), designed to prevent such abstention. In-
ter alia, it states that no court may decline on the ground of federal act of state
doctrine claims relating to expropriated property. See Banco Nacional de Cuba
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which would express any pressing concerns and particular
knowledge of the executive branch.1 33 With facts in hand,
courts then should examine how other courts have handled
similarly sensitive cases, always bearing in mind the legal obli-
gations of the United States to the international community.134
The implications of Tel-Oren for future cases involving
alien tort claims are serious. If cited for its legal analysis, the
case offers three grounds on which to deny section 1350 juris-
diction: the lack of a specified cause of action, a nonjusticiable
political question, and an alleged tort perpetrated by a nonstate
actor. Only the last basis rests on sound judicial principles as
born out by the interpretations of other courts. The first two
depend on improper interpretations of the Alien Tort Claims
Act and of the proper judicial function.
The existence of the three differing opinions in Tel-Oren
imply that this area of law is unsettled. Yet, for two hundred
years the same section 1350 analysis--examining first the na-
v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (1967) (construing the amendment). Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
790.
133. Courts have successfully requested and received advisory views from
the State Department. See Filartiga 630 F.2d at 877. They have been treated
merely as sources of information, not as executive directives. See e.g. Sayne v.
Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 684 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970) (stat-
ing that advice from the state department as to whether a treaty was still in
effect was not conclusive, but should be accorded great weight and
importance).
134. Courts must take into account their international obligations and their
role in the formation of international law. The International Court of Justice,
the tribunal of the United Nations, has declared that states owe certain obliga-
tions to the international community in general. All states have a legal inter-
est in their own protection against outlawed acts of aggression, genocide, and
violations of human rights. Therefore, domestic courts, as guardians of legal
principles, must participate by hearing cases. For example, if a foreign govern-
ment official violated international law and one of our courts recognized a
claim to immunity, the court's decision would have the undesireable effect of
supporting illegality. The judiciary's commitment to international law would
be compromised and its decision to tolerate illegality would essentially be the
same as if the court had been an accomplice of the offending government. Re-
fusal to prosecute also constitutes impermissible assistance to and toleration of
terrorist acts and therefore violates the United Nations charter provision re-
quiring states "to refrain from assisting terrorist acts in another state." See
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, first principle, ninth paragraph, 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1294 (1970). Professor
Falk asserts that "[d]omestic courts are agents of a developing international
legal order, as well as servants of various national interests .... It is readily
appreciated that domestic courts have a responsibility to improve the quality
of international legal stability.. . ." See R. FALx, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
CouRTs IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 65 (1964).
19851
240 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:211
ture of the tort and then the relationship between the tort and
the international law-consistently has been applied. The Tel-
Oren courts' departure from and reinterpretation of the Alien
Tort Claims Act may unjustly discourage the filing of otherwise
colorable claims in the face of fabricated uncertainty.
Tel-Oren must be understood in its reactionary context.
The Tel-Oren court feared that Filartiga would unleash a tor-
rent of claims that would uncontrollably flood the federal
courts and believed that the court could only stem the flood by
denying jurisdiction. Yet, five years after Filartiga, there is no
flood of section 1350 claims in the courts. Rather than adhering
to the erroneous reasoning of the Tel-Oren decision, future
courts should rely on the sound principles articulated in Filar-
tiga and on other existing procedural mechanisms to keep alien
tort claims within manageable bounds.
Virginia A. Melvin
